The Evolution of Reforms In Proceedure by Commings, Newton J.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection Historical Cornell Law School
5-1894
The Evolution of Reforms In Proceedure
Newton J. Commings
Cornell University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Commings, Newton J., "The Evolution of Reforms In Proceedure" (1894). Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection. Paper 18.
THE~SIS.
THE EVOLUTION OF REFORMS IN PROCEEDRE
BY.
NEWTON J. C OI INGS.
-00-
CORNELL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW.
-00-
1894.
, A&THORITIES.
I. The Ideal and Actual in the Law.--- Vol.XXIV.Am.LAW Re-
view, p.252.
II. Th e Province of the. Unwritten Law.-- Vol.XXVI. Am.Law Re-
view, p.1.
III. Fragraental Law Reform.-- Report of the N.Y.Ba' Associa-
tion. Vol. III, p. 111-
IV. Law and Legislation, ..-- Vol. XXVI., p. 658.
V. The Codification of the Common Law.--- Vol. XXIII., Am.
Law Review, p. 495.
VI. Jolm Stuart Mills Dissertations,-- Vol,, I., pp.355-8.
VII. The Revision and the Revisors,-- W.A.Butler, p. 22.
VIII.Adamas Roman Antiquities,-- p. 565.
IX. Law Reform in the United States, and Its Influence
Abroad,-- Vol. XXV., Am. Law Review, p. 515.
X. Law Magazine, (London) for Februrary, 1851.
XI. "Codification", -- Vol. XXIV., Am.Law Review, p. 255.
-2-
AUTHORITIES
XII. Is the Common Law a Proper Subject for Codification,--
Albany Law Journal, (1880).
XIII.New York Code of Civil Procedure.
XIV. Bishop's Code Practice.
XV. Bentham and His School of Jurisprudence.--- Vol. XXIV.,
American Law Journal, p. 735.
XVI. A Lawyer's Address to A Lay Audience,-- Vol. XXIV., Am.
LAW Review, p. 280.
XVII.The Proposed German Civil Code,-- Vol. XXIV., Am.Law Re-
view, p. 240.
XVIII. Sir. Henry Maine's " Ancient Law".
XIX. The Institutes of Gains,-- Bk. IV., Sect. 30.
XX. Pomeroy on Remedies and Remedial: Rights.
CONTENTS .
I. The Rise of the Roman Law--- The Code of Justinian-
The Stepping Stone to English and American Jurisprudence.
II. The Development of Law in England-- The Different
Systems of'Procedure-- Jeremy Bentham, the Code Champion.
III. The Position of the United States in Legal History-
New York's Important Part-- Her Bold Stand for the Code Idea-
The History of Its Rise.
IV. Dependance of England upon New York for Guidance in
Practice--- The Present Method.
V. The Codification of' he Common Law-- Conflicting
Theories--- Expediency the True Test.
VI. Ultimate Triumph of Reformed Procedure-- Men Who
Have Been Instrumental in Its Success----. Hope for A General
Code-- Concluding Observations.
In unfolding the records of' the past for a glimpse
at the listory of ancient jurisprudence, the eye can trace
the lines of progress back to the days of early Rome. Its
development is the history of civilization. The legal embryo
of the dark ages is the stately palm of modern days, whose
leafy mantle olerspreads the entire civilized world. The
more ancient means of redress known to the law were insuffi-
cient and hampered by numerous difficulties. Justice was
ofttimes robbed of its effect by popular whims and technical-
ities, so that it is not surprising that its early develop-
ment was slow. Traditionary legends and superstitions uses
abounded,entwined about the legal plantlet, a parasitic net-
work that sapped much of its early life.
But under these adversities its existence continued as
if reserved for the accomplishment of a noble mission. Man,
in the nineteen,centuries that are past, has wrought in him-
self a marvelous change.
From the nomadic wanderer, the untamed savage, and the
barbarous man-hunter, a sober, industrious, peace-loving
people has evolved. The change has been almost imperceptible.
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The mild agencies of moral and intellectual development 3a~e
been steadily at work; eliminating the baser elements of his
nature. So gradual arid slow, yet so sure has been the pro-
gress of development that even the indomitable Darwin with
his mootod theories of evolution, is- on principle practically
sustained. But with man in his primitive state there never
was a "time when some form of prooeedure and process for secur-
ing equity and justice did not prevail. Superstitions and
strange fancies were the ancient moulders of jurisprudenoe.
Yet through it all shone the beacon-light of justice, as a
star of hope for every liberty-loving, progressive people,
Reverence for ,law and order is inherent in man. The " wager
of' battle"the," hot-iron test,." and ,numerous other means of
trying offenders are now deid to the world. Some even doubt
the origin of the present system in such obnoxious customs
and usages. But, in those days, such'tests served their
purpose as effectually as modern jurisprudence serves the
needs of to-day.
Time and the development of' industry created new demands,
frequently demonstrating the necessity of' changing the old
r7
for the new. It was at this juncture that the great Justinian
came to the front with his code of written laws, eradicating
many of the more objectionable features of the old law. His
code was practically the first of its kind. It embraced not
only the better laws then in existence, but opened avenues
into other fields of thought and action, demonstrating his
breadth, originality, and liberal-mindedness as a man.
The learned Justioe Story said of him, " The Pandects of
Justinian, imperfect as they were, from the haste in which
they were compiled are a monument of imperishable glory to
the wisdom of the age; they gave to Rome, and to the civil-
ized world a system of civil maxims, which have not been ex-
celled in usefulness and equity. They superceded at once
the immense collections of former times and left them to per-
ish in oblivion; so that of all ante-Justinian jurisprudence,
little more remains than a few fragments which are now a-hd
then recovered from the dust and rubbish of antiquity in the
codices rescripti of some venerable library.,
tip to this time equity had teen comparatively unknown ,
existing only mna crude and primitive form. The arbiters of
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justice were fearful of innovations. Conservatism was at
its height, and the retention of dead forms and usages,
were a source of perpetual annoyance, and a cumbersome check
upon the progress of jurisprudence. The advance of time
developed new wants, increasing the difficulty until the
situation assumed the proportions of a perplexing problem.
The common people, strange as it may seem, were al-
most absolutely proof against anything new, and were even
more unrelenting and uncompromising than the courts them-
selves. They loved and revered the ways of their fore-
fathers, and only loosened their hold upon them when forced
to, by advanced thinkers of the day. Time and civili-
zation progressed. New nations sprang into existence in
other climes, and became prominent factors in the legal
history of the world.
Gradually the Anglo Saxon race forged to the front, Sev-
eral times their Verritoty had been invaded by the Romans,
and as a result, many Roman customs, transmitted and assimila-
ted. It is through this channel, back to the days of early
Rome, that the present system of jurisprudence is traced. Not
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alone did the Emglish system draw upon the resources of early
Rome, but later, having been conquered by tie Norman-French,
many of their customs and usages were adopted as well.
Among the more prominent of these was the celebrated
u Feudal system" which sought to regulate the holding and
method of transmitting real property. Its influence upon
English jurisprudence was marked. It placed the landed
property in the hands of a few, and in those days it being
extremely rare for any one, other than a property owner, to
be honored with a public office much less elevated to:.theo
judicial beneb, the law was of nocessity, made and adminis-
tered in the interest of classes. The maxim that " the King
can do no wrong" was universally accepted, making him the
final arbiter of all disputes that could not be settled in
his courts. The administration of equity was one of his
special functions, yet was reserved in all but peculiar
cases. As the businesspace of the times quickened, litiga-
tion increased. Then it was that the King's Chancellor was
Permitted to investigate equitahle causes with power of appeal
to th e King. And finally, this to proving Ln~ufficient, the
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greVt court of equity as a distinct and separate system of
procedure, was instituted. Thefclergy sat almost exclusively
in these tribunals, being considered the keepers of the King's
consoience, and the most satisfactory interpreters of the
peoples moral and spiritual rights. The equity system con-
strued everything liberally for the furtherance of justice,
in distinct contravention to the common law, which was bound
by chains of precedents to limited confines, and s strict in-
terpretation of the law. Conflicts arose from the holdings
of the courts which were oftimes directly., antagonistic. Each
was jealous of the other's power. The condition of affairs
became distressing, and is best described by Sir.Richard
Bethel, in his saying " It is a burning shae that a party
can recover a judgment on one side of Westminister Hall, and
on the other side be branded as a fraudulent rogue for having
recovered it."
Tyranical rulers came frequently into power and by exer-
cising their authority over the courts made the burden doubly
oppressive. The Petition of Rights, Magna Charta, amd other
measures embracing popular liberty are expressions of the
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grievances which these corrupt rulets were forced to correct.
The workings of the common law upon certain species of foreign
and domestic trade were harsh, and unfavorable to their devel-
opment, necessitating the invention and adoption of the "cus-
tom of merchants". The origin of this custom is in no single
country, but rather a combination of unwritten laws, promul-
gated by the commercial interests of the world. It was an
institution separate from the common law, forming a miniature
system of its own. Land and commercial interests thriVed
under its beneficisnt provisions, until England became the
manufacturing nation of the world. N~r was her power less
great in the military field. She planted colonies in the
more important by-ways of the Atlantic and the Pacific, and
secured a powerful foothold on the coast of the American con-
tinent. -These latter settlements developed rapidly. The
inhabitants were largely religious fugitives who resented
English dominion and loved liberty in its fullest and noblest
sense. Their needs were different than those of the mother
country, yet the same harsh measures in vogue there were en-
forced here. Unrest and general dissatisfaction prevailed.
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Until in 1776, the climax was reached, and a fierce, deter-
mined struggle gave them national independence.
And now that the American people were free, it would
seem but natural for them to tear down the old distasteful
structure and build anew, but there *Ge certain laws of na-
ture that are irmutable. They were of English cb scent, had
been reared to obey English laws, and however obnoxious they
may have been, the principle upon which they were based were
rooted as deeply in American soil as in England itself. The
main diffe-ence apparent was the greator liborality shown in
the acdministration of the laws.
Tho1 cgal remnants of the old "Feudal System" were
quickly swept away, and hundredsiother time-honored relics of
English jurisprudence were relegated to the rear. The devel-
opment og the equity system was similar to that of the mother
country, it first being maintained in a single individual,
and extended gradually until it formed a recognized judicial
tribunal of its own. The "wager of battle" and a few other
medevial tokens were retained, ut the American republic pro-
gressed by rapid strides. Each State enacting its own laws,
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subject only to the sovereign mandates of the National Con-
stitution. Hence, in order to obtain a comprehensive idea of
American jurisprudence, the necessity of selecting for a
standard, some particular State is apparent. In scanning
the list, now forty-four in all,. New York in legal development
as in numerous other respects, stands at the head. Demon-
strating her fitness for the appellation of the " Empire
State". She was the pioneer in the investigation and adopt-
ion of a reform procedure, and the fact that her system has
since been approved by nearly half og the American states,
makes her record from a legal standpoint of exceptional in--
terest and value. It was Mr.Bishop in his work on Code
Practice who mapped her legal career into three distinc*
epochs; the first extending from the aioption of the first
State constitution in 1777, to the enactment of the revised
statutes in 1830, the second from 1830, to the establishment
of the Code practice in 1848, the third from 1848, to the
present time. During the Revolutionary war the judicial
system was weak, consisting of a supreme Court and several
minor tribunals. Equity jurisdiction being in the hands of
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the governors and the Comnon pleas. The close of the war
witnessed the divorce oflaw and equity, separate and distinct
tribunals being instituted, one for legal the other for equi-
table causes.
In 1786, the "trial by battle", another of the old Eng-
lish customs was abolished. It was a meant whereby the phys-
ical capacity of the O claimants was tested with a mutual
understanding 1 that to the victor should belong the spoils".
During this period of construction- and reconstruction the
State legislature had been active, and ordered at the opening
of the nineteenth century- 1801-4- two compilations of the
State statutes. In the year 1813, another order was issued
for the revision and compilation of all laws of a general and
permanent nature. But the main struggle for a sweeping reform
in procedure comenced about 1828, almost simultaneously with
the movement in the English Parliament. The general awaken-
ing in New York resulted in the enactemnt of the ReVised
Statutes in 1830, and opened the second epoch of her legal
history. To the indefatigable efforts of John D3uer, Benjamin
F.Butler, and John C. Spencer, is the progress of this period
-1l-
largely due.
Public attention was next centered upon the courts, for
Chancery practice and the different circuits and supreme
courts were no longer harmonious under the changed condition
of affairs. Needless expense and delay in reaching a final
hearing was the result, which combined with the growing sense
that the old forms were no longer adapted to the mercantile
and commercial needs of the rime, created a constant feeling
of dissatisfaction, which foujd popular expression in the
Constitution of 1848. The judicial system of the state was
largely remodelled, and a Court of Appeals established, which
in 1869, assumed the shape of the present appellate tribunal.
From 1847, to 1852, the contest over t19 adoption of a code
system of procedure was hotly waged, culminating in the ap-
pointment of three commissioners to codify the law.
In 1848, largely through the zealous efforts of David
Dudley Field, the Code of Civil Procedure was enacted, and in
1852 the completed Code reported in '49, assumed its final
form. Say Bishop in his"Code Practice" ,, It introduced a
quarter of a century in advance of Englan~d a logical and sys-
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tematic body of rules governing the procedure in a civil
action, and wiped out of existence at, a breath, a mass of
technical and burdensome hindrances. to the administration of
justice." During this period England had been engaged in a
contest no less animated than that in New York, the only dif-
ference being the greater amounit of time absorbed in coming
to a conclusion. The merits and demerits of the code as agai-
st the common law was the absorbing theme of the hour, and
the ultimate triumph of the code is due to the praiseworthy
efforts of Jeremy Bentham. For it was he who first attacked
the established system with the utmost virulance, and his
theories though derided in his day became afterward the power-
ful bulwarks of his former opposers.
Said Lord Brougham, one of his most formidable antago-
nists, " The age of law reform and the age of Jeremy Bentham
are one and the same. No one before him had thought od expos-
ing the defects in our English system of jurisprudence. It
was he who first made the mighty step of trying the whole
provisions of our jurisprudence by the test of expediency,
fearlessly examining how far each part was connected with the
-13-
rest and with a yet undaunted courage inquiring how far its
most consistent and symmetrical arrangements were framed ac-
cording to the principles which should pervade a code of laws,
their adaption took the circumstanc(s of society, to the
wants of men, and to the promotion of human happiness." In
Bentham's day the "Feudal System", was at its height, with
all of its attendant evils so distasteful to a liberty-loving,
industrious progressive people. The equity of freedom in
courts of law from the technicalities which then hampered
procedure was Bentham's dogma, and though litterly opposed by
men like Burke, Brougham, and Blackstone . he did not waiver
in thelest. His earnest, persistent efforts at a period so
critical, won for reformed procedure a victory unparallelled
in the history of law.
The code idea was by no means new, in fact it had been
tested in Justinian's time, and afterwards elsewhere with suc-
cess. It was the dread fear of innovations that had prac-
tically banished all hope of its adoption. The sentiment
against legal reform is best described by Burke in his ever
memorable utterance, " I do not dare to rub off a particle of
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the venerable rust that rather adorns and preserves than de-
stroys the metal. It would be a profanation to touch with a
tool the stones. I would not violate with modern polishthe
ingenious and moble roughness of those truly constitutional
materials. Tampering is tie odious vice of restless and un-
stable minds. 1 put my foot in the tracks of my forefathers
where I can neither wander nor stumble. What the law has said
I say. In all things else I am silent. I have no organ but
for her words. If this be not ingenious I am sure it is safe!
So deep-seated was the prejudice of Burke and his followers
against Bentham and his favorite theories that twenty-five
tears elapsed ere their hostilities ceased. In the meantime
Bentham died, without learning the ultimate success of his am-
bition. With the conversion of Brougham and Burke progress
was rapid. The people had confidence in their ability to
lead, and at their instigation enacted, in 1852-304, the "com-
mon law practice acts", which taken together, formed an embry-
onic code of procedure. These acts were based largely upon
the Code of Civil Procedure of N.Y., adopted in 1848, yet
failed to accomplish the grandest feat and prime motive of
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that code viz., that of abolishing all distinctions between
actions at law and suits in equity. It was not until 1873,
that the true merit of the reformed system was fully recognizei
when the English U Judicature Act" was passed, which followed
closely the logic and syst eetic arrangement previously out-
lined t New York. The common law and equity systems were,
under it, retained as separate and distinct tribunals, but
the modes of procedure, the form of actions ad the pleadings
were completely changed. England's present method is prac-
tically free fronubtleties and technicalities that surround-
ed her ancient practice, and if its adoption as the procedure
of her more important colonies is a safe criterion for judging
of its worth, its fitness for a great system in the future
is clearly demonstrated. And now that the English Acts are
allied so closely in fact based upon the practice of New York,
a more comprehensive review of her system, and its character-
istic features might n~t be a serious disadvantage. The a-
doption of the code of '48, was in a certain sense new,for it
completely revolutionized the system in operation and rendered
the attorney of fifty years standing as powerless as the
embryo of eighteen.
Thousands of volumes pertaining to the old practice be-
came practically worthless, so that the welcome for the new-
comer by the devotees of Chitty, was less hale and hearty
than had been anticipated. The confusion was like a whirl-
wind but temporary. Its simplicity lended to its attractive-
ness until the profession began thoroughly to appreciate the
merit of the change. But *nfortunately the end of the diff'i-
culty was not yet, for the courts at the outset were no less
embarassed than the profession, and having grown accustomed
to fixed ways, yielded them reluctantly. The success of' fail-
ure of the Code depended largely upon them, for in them rested
the power of construing its provisions, and prejudico too
often became a potent factor in stripping it of its best re-
sults. But neverthbless the simplicity of the new departure
was bound to win approval. Scores of technical forms had
been oblitor~ated, and all actions both at law and in equity
reduced to two. Previously separate law and equity tribunals
had been maintained, now they were formallyunited. No longer
did tI rent dy depend upon technical f'orm of action, but upon
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the facts of tlh case. In every action the process was the
same until the litigants arrived in* court, when their argu-
ments as to the true nature of the proceeding was hcuard. The
reason for the existence of two forms of action instead of
one was technical. The trouble arose over cases of default
in which damages were difficult to assess. The clerk was per-
mitted to assume this responsibility when the amount was fixed
and definite, as in the case of goods sold and delivered
without interference from the court. But in other oases,
like assault and battery, where the damages were uncertain,
special authority from the court was necessary. It was there-
fore upon this point that the Field Summons split. The rule
briefly stated is this:- if the action was on contract,it was
covered by the summons for money, if for any other purpose
by the sumons for relief. The certainty or uncertainty of
tTU damages being the effectual test, liquidated damages sig-
nifying the former, unliquidated the latter remedy. This
narrow distinction was recognized until Mr.Throopls commission
was instituted. He immediately took the matter in hand and
succeeded in reducing every action to one rorni., that for
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money. This single civil action invented by the Tjroop coM-
mission cleared up many existing uncertainties. Greater sim-
plicity prevailed, and the New York Code took a long stride
in advance as a result of its contact with master minds. By
this one form of civil action, in which the distinction be-
tween actions at law and suits in equity and the forms of
those actions and suits were abolished, technically speaking
all preliminary formal proceedings were eradicated, but the
same difference between the actions themselves, exists as be-
fore. The great advantage of the code idea is the practi-
cal ease with which litigants are admitted into court, all of
the fine common law distinctions so fatal oftimes under that
system, are by it entirely obliterated, and any differences
that may exist between the vatious actions themselves are now
settled in court.
The success of this idea was not limited to the narrow
confibes of New York alone, one after another the newer states
in which the principles of the old method had not grown so
firmly rooted, began similar investigations, COncluding inva-
riably with a like result. It was information g4eaned from
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this source that enabled England to frame her it Judicature
Act". For twenty-five years she had been groping in utter
darkness, making vast expenditures of money with no result.
It was not until the report of the Field Conmission that light
streamed in upon them. The battle in the home of the comon
law was fought and won, and the new system wgs adopted in
England, India, Australia, and several other powerful colonies
in its stead.
In this country fUlly half of the states have sanctioned
its use, leaving it oly a question of time when all must
yield. It was and is still urged by certain co~mon law states
that the code practice is a change touradical in its nature,
and that a gradual rise to an ideal by the introduction of
suitable "practico acts" would be the wiser policy to pursue.
[n harmony with this idea nearly all of these states have a-
dopted such acts, and in some of them notably Connecticut,
they are a decided success. Their aim is to revolutionize
procedure by degrees; to retain the old system in principle
merely stripping it occasionally of' an objectionable feature,
while t1e code sweeps everything at a breath. It is held by
the advocates of radiual reform that delays are impracticable
and dangerous; tha anything which has been conclusively
proven datrimental in its workings and bad in itself ought
not for an instan6ebe tolerated, but be entirely swept awaj
at the first opporunity. Instead of slowly workingup to an
ideal standard, it is maintained that the retention, for an
uncertain period, of these needless forms and distinctions
would work more serious- detriment than COuld possibly result.
from an absolute @1ange . At the present time there are no
s tates proceeding strictly on the..old theory. A revolution
more or less extensive has been in progress everywhere, and
careful scrutiny reveals the fact that several professed com-
mon law states are now, to all intents and purposes, code
states. Their statutory acts regulating procedure conform# so
closely to proceedings under the code that an unbiased critic
is bound . to. conclude that their difference is but ..... Then
why it is that tieee same!-states will deliberately deride a
system-similar to- their own, becuuse of that trifling differ-
ence is more than the unprejudiced eye can see.
.But there is another field, outside the domain of- statute
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law, in which a heated controversy is even now being waged.
The radical code supporter is here advogating the codification
of the coinmon law as wel as the statute, while the more con-
servative element in the professioM are struggling against
it. The former class holds that it is the very refinement
of injustice to inflict punishment for the breach of an un-
known law. It is asserted that the tyrant Caligula, with his
laws written in characters toosmall to be read, and elevated
beyond public inspection, hlad devised a scheme no more unjust
in its workings than this. Is not a repetition of this ex-
ample constantly occurring on every hand to-day? Does it
not cast a veil of uncertainty about jurisprudence that pre-
sages danger to indibidual libarty?
All of these queries and numerous others are being con-
stantly asked, approximating to the premise that. he who has
liabilities and obligations to perform has a corresponding
right to know their source and avoid their creation. The
conservative immediately dissents, theorizing that the exist-
ence of these rights and liabilities as commnon law is suf-
ficient notice to the individual; that a court thornughly
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cognizant with principles of equity is the only suitable tri-
bunal to amimably settle the controversy; that a3;y attempt
to codify these rights and liabilities must at best be im-
practicable and imperfect, for cases frequently arise of
which the code writer never dreamed. All these offenses
is urged would be remediless , for the thoroughness of the re-
formed system permits the punishment of no grievance# not
enumerated within its sections. A proper sifting of these
conflicting theories sunimarizes to this; that the codification
of this feature of the law is purely a question oi expediency.
At this age of the world when tyranny is at an ebb and when
courts of justice comprise the ablest men the profession af-
fords, the fear of gross injustice is sensibly diminished.
The most powerful argument in its favor must be that, in the
course of' events, all statute law will be codified, and that
for convenience it would be wise to complete the system, and
define every right and liability to'which the individual is
subject. The fear of injustice under present circum-
stances by the codeite, and. the claim of incompetency on t1he
part of the code-writer by the conservative, are neither of
material weight.
So deeply is justice imbedded in our judicial system
that it cannot be easily uprooted, and there never has been
a time when the profession was more firmy grounded in the
principles ;that underly and control the rights of men, than
they are to-day. Not alone are they versed in rules of o
procedure and principles of equity, but also learned in
scientific legal research as well, which renders them eminent-
ly fit for the codification of any law, be it comon or stat-
ute. ....The profession of to-day embraces thinkers capable of
ding .original work. The day for forensic outbursts of orato-
ry has passed, and the day of discursive methods has taken its
place.,.." The facts in the case to be litigated will alone
satisfy the desire of the court, and men who can suitably pre-
sent them are in d'emand. The modern lawyer is elastic and
easily adapts himself to new situations and changing circum-
stances. The code idea ia in a certain sense new, being a
wide departure from the practice under the common law, but
the principles upon which jurisprudence is based are immu-
table, and must continue the same under any form of procedure.
-23u-
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The highest ambition of the code is to mkae legal practice
simple and easy. To this end te zealous efforts of such
men as John Duer, Benjanin F.Butler, John C.Spencer, Aphaxid
Loomis, David Dudley Foeld, I.ontgomery Throop, and Charles A,
Collin, have been directed. And should this system finallly
predominate, its success will be due in no snall degree to
such indefatigable workers as these. Nor is the hope of its
final-supremacy a vague one, for it has been said by that
celebratod judicial luminary, Judge Story, I know of but one
adequate remedy for the vast accumulation of statutes and
text authorities, and that is, by a gradual digest under
legislative sanction of those portions of our jurisprudence
which under the forming hand of the judiciary, shall from
time to time acquire scientifi4c accurracy.
By thus reducing to a test the exact principles of the
law, we shall, in a great measure get ri of the necessity
of appealing to volumes which contain jarrtng and discordant
opinions; and thus we may pave the way to a general code
which will present in its positive and authoritative text,
the most material rules to guido the lawyer, the statesman,
-25-
and the private citizen." So that in the light of an asser-
tion so sweeping in its nature, it cannot be idle to conjec-
ture that the freedom of procedure from the maizes of uncer-
taint-y thatzmow surrounds itiwill be ultimately attained, and
the reformed idea be finally inculcated into a system for
the world.
Newton.J.Commings, L.S. 194o
May 22, 1894.

